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In support of such a position we can further say that the perception of discrete contents has been claimed by Prasastapada not only as a cause but also as pramana in respect of the cognitions cited by him in his examples. If the word 'pramana' stands for the karana in respect of prama and if the karana is interpreted as the immediate antecedent (i.e., as sadhakatama kaarana) as has been proposed by some, our argument does surely gain greater acceptability. Let us therefore elucidate this thesis of Prasastapada in some detail.

It is known to all students of Indian philosophy that karana (instrumental cause) is asadharana (usually translated as extraordinary) kaarana (cause), and that this is taken either as the latest of the conditions (sadhakatama / phala-ayoga-vyavacchinna) or as a condition (vyaparavat) that produces the phenomenon in question by producing something which also acts as a cause in respect of the phenomenon. The first position is very old and held by philosophers of different schools while the second one is of later innovation made by the philosophers elonging to the modem school of Nyaya founded by Gangesa. The causal condition which is the latest to arise for the production of an effect cannot be more than one and in that sense it is an asadharana or extra-ordinary causal condition. Similarly, something that produces an effect by producing an intermediate thing which also is a cause for the same thing is an extraordinary causal condition, as this intermediate thing occurring the effect necessarily takes place. In fact, this intermediate thing is mostly, though not always, the karana also according to the first interpretation. A philosopher should have the freedom to choose any of the two stipulations and may indeed use one in one context and the other in another context. In our present context the nrvikalpaka cognition is held by Prasastapada's followers to be an extra-ordinary causal condition in respect of qualified cognition (visesana-apeksa pratyaksa, in Prasastapada's terminology) ⁷. Supposing that the perception in his examples are cases of prama or knowledge, this condition is then also to be called a pramana in the sense of being the karana of prama. But the interpretation that is being followed here is clearly the first one.

If some philosopher chooses, as Gangesa does, to follow the vyaparavat model of interpretation the nirvikalpaka cannot be regarded as such a causal condition, that is, as the karana of prama. The factor that produces an intermediate thing which along with that factor produces the qualified cognition will be such an extra-ordinary causal condition. Gangesa takes the sense organ as a causal condition that produces the qualified cognition by producing the contact with the object which also is necessary for that cognition. Hence, according to the second stipulation about the concept of karana it is not the nirvikalpaka but the sense organ which is to be regarded as the karana and also the pramana in respect of the qualified perception. It may be noticed here that the sensory contact is not the last (i.e., the latest) of the conditions to generate the qualified cognition, for unless that contact occurs and thus obtains the nirvikalpaka also cannot occur for producing the qualified cognition. The intermediate factor, if the nirvikalpaka is not to be so regarded in this context, is then not. the latest (sadhakatama/phala-ayoga-vyavacchinna) condition. If, however, the nirvikalpaka itself is taken as the karya (effect) the sensory contact can be regarded as the latest condition. Clearly there, is some ambiguity here as the nirvikalpaka itself may be regarded as such an intermediate factor with reference to the later cognition in as much as it is caused by the sense organ and also causes the qualified cognition. Such an ambiguity is however absent in the first stipulation as no two conditions can be called karana according to this stipulation. Therefore, if this stipulation is to be preferred for this reason, it will certainly be a matter of greater justification to treat, as the Vaisesikas do, the nirvikalpaka as the karana and also as the pramana in respect of the visesana-apeksa cases of perception ⁸.

This Vaisesika strategy was carefully avoided by Gangesa and his followers who denied that a cognition can be karana in respect of perception though such karana in respect of non-perceptual cognition is necessarily some cognition or other. In fact this thesis has been utilised by them in the formulation of the definition of perception as a cognition the karana in respect of which is something other than a cognition (i.e., as jnana-akaranaka-jnana). These philosophers do not however deny that the nirvikalpaka is a cause (kaarana) of the visesana-apeksa perception. But they will admit its necessity only as a condition in the role of cognition of the visesana which itself is not a qualified cognition. This, in fact, represents the Navya Nyaya argument for admitting the nirvikalpaka.

Prasastapada himself asserts that though the visesana-apeksa cognition is due to the nirvikalpaka this nirvikalpaka does not owe its origin to any cognition whatsoever⁹. In this sense, as the commentators mention, the nirvikalpaka is the simplest and ultimate cognition of the visesana, being itself not qualified¹⁰. But the nirvikalpaka is something more for Prasastapada and his followers. According to them if the qualified perception is true and is prama then, as has been noted by us earlier, this perception must be due to the efficacy of the nirvikilpaka without which the resultant perception would not have been a true cognition, that is. an instance of prama.

The thesis of paratahpramanya (extrinsic validity) in respect of origin of pramanya as developed in Navya Nyaya stipulates that the truth in respect of a perceptual cognition is due to a factor which is other than the factors that produce this cognition qua a perceptual cognition. Thus, an illusory perception or a veridical one is equally due to sensory contact. But if it is a case of veridical perception it is due to contact with a thing (the visesya) which does actually have the property/ feature in it that appears as the visesana in the qualified cognition.¹¹ This feature of the sensory contact is called guna in Sanskrit which means a (meritorious) quality as opposed to defect or dosa. But, in a sense, this is arguing in a circular way. Truth of the cognition consists in the visesya thing's possessing the visesana. Thus, if the guna in question is so formulated that it presupposes this (in stating that the required sensory contact with the object is actually contact with a thing that must have the visesana in it), the Navya Nyaya formulation of the thesis of paratah pramanya does not carry conviction as an explanation of the origin of the veridicality of perception.

The Vaisesika thesis that truth is ensured by the nirvikaipaka is supposed to be not inconsistent with the theory of extrinsic validity. It rather seems to fare better, as it does not have the ring of circularity around it. It may be said that the sensory contact necessary for the nirvikaipaka and for that matter also nor the pratyaksa prama is actually contact with the thing which is not only the visesya but is something that does have the visesana in it. The Navya Nyaya and the Vaisesika theses do not thus substantially differ from one another. Nevertheless it can be claimed that the truth analysis is not inbuilt in the thesis of the nirvikalpaka which is defined as acquaintance of discrete contents (svarupa- alocana-matra). But the truth analysis is very much imbedded in the guna thesis concerned (namely, viseanavadvisesyasannikarsa).

Given this subtle difference of the Vaysesika thesis from the Navya Nyaya one as mentioned here we can utilise it in expressing our preference for the Vaisesika thesis that the nrivikalpaka is the pramana, i.e., the karana in respect of visesana-apeksa-pratyaksa-prama as it does not smack of circularity in any way. If the conditions including the sensory contact that produce the nirviklipaka are still in operation now being aided by the nirvikalpaka itself produced by them, the cognition being produced is not only perception but also a veridical one. Where the nirvikalpaka about the visesana is missing, for example, in perceptual illusion about a thing as silver when the thing is not actually silver the resultant cognition cannot be an instance of prama ¹².

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