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In Prasastapada's work all the six examples have been represented by a single Sanskrit sentence (Sat dravyam prthivi visani suklah gaur gacchati) which has been translated by us by six different independent sentences in English. If the word 'dravya' is taken as the visesya word also in respect of the other cases, the first example will not be different from the other ones in this respect. Following the commentators we have however treated the remaining examples as distinct from the first one by treating them as single worded sentence in as much as the word 'dravya' is not taken as part of these sentences, although the subject of such sentences, ontologically speaking, is actually a substance. But if the other interpretation (i.e., the word 'dravya' be taken as the word for the visesya) is accepted then if substance-hood is taken as a prakara (and therefore also as a visesana) in respect of the visesya in question (it does not matter what the major visesana is, that is, whether it a universal or substance or quality or action), the preceding nirvikalpaka would have, for its discrete contents, that specific substance, substance-hood, and the major visesana (which is a universal in respect of the first and also in respect of the second and fifth examples and which is a particular in respect of the remaining ones).

If the word 'substance' is not taken as representing the visesya in these examples then the preceding cognition is about the referent of the word 'this' used by us within parentheses in our translation. The referent, although an individual substance, does not figure as something as having the property of substance-hood and the respective other contents figure as contents as pertaining to the visesya in question.

As the cases other than the first, second and the fifth are such that the visesana-s involved in them are not universals, the perception of svarupa-alocana-matra type, if it is to be supposed to be operative as a cause here, must be about discrete objects, namely, about the visesya (referent of the word 'this') and the visesana concerned which also is a particular. As this particular is substance (a pair of horns) in case of (“(This) has horns"), a quality (white colour) in case of ("(This) is white") and motion in ("(This) is moving") these particulars are not without a universal although this universal does not inhere in the subject or the visesya but inheres in the visesana which is distinct from it. Therefore, this universal also must figure as content in the preceding cognition. But the question is whether in this preceding cognition this universal is taken to be a property of the visesana. If this is the case then this preceding cognition is not an instance of mere acquaintance or svarupa-alocana-matra as the visesana and its universal which are its contents are to be understood as related. The preceding cognition may however be treated as mere acquaintance in which that visesana (which is a particular) and its universal figure as discrete contents along with the visesya of the cognition in the example. Such a position cannot however be maintained if the visesana-apeksa-perception as represented in Prasastapada's examples is a case of what has come to be known in later Nyaya as a case of visista-vaisistya-avagahi-buddhi.

A cognition of this type is one in which the visesana in respect to the visesya is taken as qualified by some further visesana, for example, in Raktadandavan purusah (The person has a red stick (in his hand)), the main visesana here being the stick which again is taken as a red one, that is, taken as related to red colour. It is here stipulated that such a composite cognition must be causally due to a cognition which is not about discrete contents but actually about some of the contents as related, in the example cited the preceding cognition is about the stick as red, the red colour (which is a limitor of visesanata.) figuring as the prakara in respect of the stick. Hence, if Prasastapada's examples (iii), (iv) and (vi) are treated as cases of such composite cognitions, these should be taken as due to a simpler visesana-apeksa-jnana about the pair of horns as related to the universal of being a horn, about the white colour as related to its specific universal and about motion as related to its universal in respective cases. It seems to us that this was not perhaps the intention of Prasastapada as he has offered his examples in illustration of the perception of visesana-apeksa type which he apparently takes to be directly due to mere-acquaintance variety of perception. We can also put forward some other arguments against the hypothesis under reference.

The hypothesis of visista-vaisistya-avagahi-buddhi stipulates that the cognition immediately preceding the perception in the examples under consideration (that is, in the third, fourth and sixth cases) is about the thing figuring in the later cognition as the visesana but as related to its specific universal and perhaps also along with the visesya which is a substance as a discrete content in it. If that substance figures also as a qualified content in it there will be no logical difference between the two perceptions and the hypothesis will also be open to the charge of infinite regress as the preceding perception like the original one shall have to be taken to be due to a similar perception. It may thus be held that this preceding perception is about that substance as a discrete content but also about the visesana as characterised  by its own universal. Alternatively, it may be maintained that this previous perception is only about this relational complex involving the visesana and its universal and not about the substance as a discrete unrelated content. But this is not acceptable as Prasastapada stipulates that the substance figures as the content in the two perceptions to be taken as causally related of which the perception taken as the cause is a mere acquaintance only. Thus, we shall have to consider whether the perception acting as the cause in respect of the final visesana-apeksa cognition is all about discrete contents or not. If it is about the visesya-substancebut not understood as related to the visesana and also about the visesana-complex involving the visesana as characterized by its universal we shall have to assume that the visesya-substance figures as a content also in a preceding third perception in which the visesana and its universal are to be supposed to figure only as discrete contents along with the substance if all the contents are to be taken as discrete and unrelated. But if we drop this substance from the immediately preceding perception we shall have to hold that it figures only in the earliest cognition in relation to the visesana-apeksa perception represented in the examples cited, which is to be taken as the cause of the original perception represented by the examples in question. The two alternatives in that case would thus agree in respect of the contents of the earliest perception although they would differ in respect of the contents of the intermediate perception. But it will be difficult to take this earliest perception as the cause of the perception in the cited examples as it will be a remote and not an immediate antecedent in respect of it. Therefore, it should be supposed that the substance figures as a content also in the intermediate perception and thus there will be no difference between the first and the second alternatives. But the postulation of this intermediate perception will in any case be an unnecessary duplication of causes in respect of the original perception in the examples as it is supposed here that both the earliest and the intermediate perceptions are causes. Hence, the intermediate perception may be dropped from the causal process, the necessary implication being that Prasastapada's examples are not cases of visista-vaisistya-avagahi cognition and also that the perception to be taken as the cause are about all the three, namely, the substance (viseya), the visesana and its universal as discrete contents. This can also be claimed to be consistent with the principle of non-delay (avilamba) in the rise of effect.

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