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The necessity of the second condition is borne out by ordinary usage. To know that p implies that p is. true. To say that one knows that p and that p is false is to utter a contradiction. The term 'true knowledge' is not a happy term, for the adjective 'true', in this case, is redundant. Any discussion about the truth condition naturally presupposes a theory of truth. There are different theories of truth, viz., the correspondence theory, the coherence theory, the pragmatic theory and the semantic theory of truth. We shall not enter into any discussion about these different theories of truth. But; let us suppose, when we are talking about the truth condition, we have something like the correspondence theory of truth in mind which has a very wide appeal.
Let us now state a few relevant points about the first condition.6 Is belief a necessary condition for knowing? According to some, knowledge is incompatible with belief. According to others, knowledge entails belief. If I know that p, then I also believe that p. This theory may be taken to have a stronger and a weaker version. In the weaker version of this theory knowledge entails belief but not being sure. Beliefs may range from those which have no certainty to those having strongest conviction. Knowledge goes with beliefs of any one of this range. The stronger version holds not only that knowledge entails belief but also that it entails being sure. If I know that p then I am certain that p. If 1 know that the earth moves round the sun then I am also certain that the earth moves round it. There is no hesitation or doubt on my part. The stronger version of entailment theory, however, is subject to severe criticism. The objection is raised by A.D. Woozley. He rejects this theory by producing a counterexample. The counter­example may be called the case of the "unconfident examinee".7 Suppose that an examinee gives fumbling, unconfident but always correct answers to a series of questions. He is not certain that his answers are the true ones. Yet, might we not attribute know­ledge to this examinee ?
The denial of the entailment theory is that knowledge does not entail belief. This thesis also has a stronger and a weak r version. According to the stronger version knowledge excludes belief. Knowledge and belief cannot coexist. Kap entails —Bap. According to the weaker version, though it is possible to know a proposition but not to believe it, knowledge does not rule out belief. In other words, knowledge docs not entail the absence of belief.
The stronger version of the denial of the entailment theory has for its evidence some linguistic arguments. If I know a proposition p, it would be inappropriate for me to say that I believe it. In fact, it is not only inappropriate but will be positively misleading. If somebody tells you that he believes that the last train has left, you may think that perhaps the train has not left. But if he would have said that he knows that the last train has left, there would be no room for such hopes. But this linguistic argument does not show that knowledge and belief cannot coexist. It only points to some aspects of linguistic usage. This can be shown with the help of an example. Let us suppose that a person is introducing his wife to one of his colleagues. Now, even though it i true that his wife happens to be the woman with whom he is living it would be inappropriate for the husband to say "She is the lady with whom I am living" instead of saying "She is my wife".

The weaker version of the denial of the entailment theory consists in holding that knowledge may sometimes occur in the absence of belief. A man may sometimes know p but may not believe it. To take an example, a mother may very well know that her son is fickle, irresponsible and thoroughly untrustworthy, but being a mother she may refuse to believe it. Thus, here, it might be said that the mother has the knowledge without having the corresponding belief. This example will gain ground only when a certain issue is settled. The question is: Do we have any freedom with regard to holding our belief? The apparent paradoxical character of this situation may be explained by stipulating that in this case there is the presence of belief along with a tendency not to believe. So we would say that it is not a case of absence of belief along with the presence of knowledge but a case where there is knowledge with a tendency not to believe what should actually be known to be true. Belief thus seems to be a necessary condition of knowing.

The third condition is the justification condition or evidence condition. True belief would not always amount to knowledge. One may come to believe that misfortune may befall him because he had walked under the ladder inadvertently. And he indeed did suffer misfortune. But it cannot be said that in this case the person concerned has knowledge; what he lacked is justification. If a person believes that the fireworks party will be spoiled due to rain because he heard the weather bulletin over the television, then he may be said to be justified in his belief that the fireworks party will be spoiled due to rain. Truth, belief and justification thus are the three necessary conditions of knowing and together they constitute the sufficient condition of knowing.

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