RESEARCH PAPERS

Gettier's counterexamples and his presuppositions
Sutapa Saha

 

....Previous

NOTES & REFERENCES

  1. The term 'knowledge' has other usages, such as, knowledge in the sense of acquaintance, knowledge in the sense of having an ability to do a thing. For a detailed account, see A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, London, Macmillan, 1956, p. 8.
  2. In 'Is justified true belief knowledge?' (A. Phillips Griffiths, ed., Knowledge and Belief, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p.144), Edmund L. Gettier writes: "Plato seems to be considering some such definitions at Theaetetus 201, and perhaps accepting one at Meno 98".
  3. Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1957, p. 16.
  4. A. J. Aycr, The Problem of Knowledge, p. 31.
  5. Ibid., p. 32.
  6. D.M.Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, London, Cambridge,1973, pp. 137-149.
  7. A. D. Woozley, 'Knowing and not knowing' in Phillips Griffiths, ed., Knowledge and Belief and also in D. II. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, p. 141.
  8. Edmund L. Gettier, 'Is justified true belief knowledge?' Analysis 23, (1963), 121-123, reprinted in Phillips Griffiths, ed., Knowledge and Belief and Paul. K. Moser and Arnold Vander Nat, eds., Human knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, London, Oxford University Press, 1987.
  9. See 'Is justified true belief knowledge'?'
  10. Robert Almeder, 'Truth and Evidence', Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1974), 365-368.
  11. In the paper, Truth and Evidence' Almeder gives two arguments to prove his point. But in a later paper 'On being justified in believing false propositions' (Philosophia, 1985) he gives three arguments to establish his thesis. The first two arguments are the same. The third argument is as follows. If one is completely justified in believing a proposition then he is also justified in using this proposition to justify some other propositions. Now if the proposition which is justified is false, then a false proposition may be used as an evidence for another proposition. 'But this amounts to saying that there are false justifiers. There can, however, be no false justifiers.
  12. Robert Almeder 'On being justified in believing false proposi­tions', Philosophia, 1985, p. 271.
  1. See William E. Hoffmann, 'Almeder on Truth and Evidence', The Philosophical Quarterly, 25 (1975), pp. 59 61.
  2. Robert Almeder 'On being justified in believing false propositions',p. 276.
  3. Ibid., p. 216.
  4. R. M. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, Second Edition, New Delhi, Prentice Hall of India, 1977, p. 99.
  5. See Fred. I. Dretskc, 'Reasons and Consequences,' Analysis, (1968), 166-168 and 'Epistemic Operators', Journal of Philosophy, 67(1970), 1007-1023.
  6. Fred I. Dretske, 'Epistemic Operators', p. 1009.
  7. This point has been discussed in detail by Sandhya Basu in her paper 'Gettier's principle for deducibility for justication', published in Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1988.
  8. Fred, I. Drelske, 'Episicmic Operators', p. 101.5.
  9. P. F. Stawson, Individuals. London, Melhucn & Co., 1977, p. 190 and 'Indentifying Reference and Truth Values', Logico-Linguistic Papers. London, Methuen & Co., 1977, p. 82.
  10. Irving Thalberg, 'In Defense of Justified True Belief, Journal of Philosophy, 66 (1969), pp. 795 803.
  11. Reference to Keith Donellan's distinction (See his 'Reference and Definite Descriptions', Philosophical Review. 1966) has been made by Michael K. Hooker 'In Defense of a Principle of Deducibility of Justification' in Philosophical Studies. 24 (1 973), 402 404. This kind of argument will be available to Thalberg provided the definite description 'The man who will get the job' is taken to be a referring expression. As Hooker points out, the definite description might not be used as a referring expression. Russell, for example, will translate the sentence "The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket" into "There is at least one man who will gel the. job and only one man will get the job and that man has ten coins in his pocket".
  12. M. K. Hooker, ‘In Defense of a Principle of Deducibility of Justifica­tion', p. 403.
  13. Ibid., p. 405.
  14. See Irving Thalberg 'Is Justification Transmissible through Dedu­ction?', Philosophical Studiest25 (1974), 347 356.
  15. Ibid. p. .355.
  16. Peter D. Kelin, Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism, Minneapolis,University of Minnesota Press, 1981, pp. 30-31.
  17. Ibid., p. 31.
  18. C. G. New 'Some Implications of "Someone"', Analysis 26 (1966),62-64.
  19. James , M. Smith, 'New Implications of "Someone"', Analysis 26(1966), 207 208.
  20. C.G, New, '"Someone" Renewed', Analysis 28(1968), 109-112.
  21.  James M. Smith, 'New Implications of "Someone"', p. 208.
  22. Robert G.Meyers and Kenneth Stern, 'Knowledge Without Paradox', Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973), 147 160.
  23. J. A. Hart and R. Dees 'Paradox Regained: A Reply to Meyers and Stern', Journal of Philosophy. 71 (1974), 367-372.