Gettier's counterexamples and his presuppositions |
Further, New fails to realise that the fact to which he refers to bring out the ambiguity of the word 'someone' really goes to prove its unambiguity. The fact that we are using the same word 'someone' when it is followed by the clause 'I must not tell who' and when it is followed by the clause 'I must find out who' implies that the word 'someone' has a meaning which is quite compatible with the meaning of the clauses following it. The word 'someone' means 'at least one person'. Thus the sentence “Someone owns a car” means "At least one person owns a car". And this does not imply that the word 'someone* is used in a technical sense and its meaning is a stipulated one. That it is not so, is shown by James Smith by pointing to an ordinary usage where 'someone' is used to mean at least one. The following is the example: 1.5 The third presupposition The third presupposition on which Getticr counterexamples rest (but which was not mentioned by Gettier) was that there may be false justifiers. There may be some propositions which justify other propositions but which are in fact false. In Gettier's first counterexample, "Jones will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket" is a false proposition which justifies the conclusion, "The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket". Unless there is the possibility of having false evidence, the first Gettier counterexample cannot be constructed. R. G. Meyers and K. Stern contest this presupposition.35 They examine three principles of which the second one called principle (B) is relevant here. They accept the principle (B): If p justifies h for S, then p. This clearly controverts the Gettier presupposition. This principle may appear to some to be over-restrictive. “Mr. Nogot owns a Ford” entails the proposition "Someone owns a Ford". The latter is entailed also by the proposition "Mr. Havit owns a Ford". If Smith is justified in believing both the propositions, he is thus justified in believing "Someone owns a Ford", which is derived from the conjunctive proposition which is false. Now if principle (B) is accepted, then the conjunctive proposition would not justify "Someone owns a Ford", which thus remains unjustified ; yet no one will deny that here Smith has knowledge. Meyers and Stern's answers to the anticipated objections depend entirely on the distinction which they introduce between the justification that S gives and S's actual justification. But this distinction is not intelligible. It is not at all clear what they mean by 'actual justification'. Even if the concept is somehow made intelligible, it is not clear how we can have any access to S's actual justification. The only justification which is available to us is the justification which he gives. For knowing what S's actual justification is, we have to depend entirely on what S says. However, Meyers and Stern try to bring out the difference between justification that S gives and S's actual justification with the help of illustrations. Suppose that S believes that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford on the basis of some evidence and he also believes that Mr. Havit owns a Ford. Here it may be pointed out to S that Mr. Nogot does not own a car. But if S is ready to accept the belief that Mr. Havit owns a Ford, then on the basis of both these propositions he comes to believe' 'Someone owns a Ford". Actually Mr. Nogot does not own a car and Mr. Havit does. This is enough to justify "Someone owns a car." S may be credited with knowledge and consequently with justification. Here the original justification which S gave was the conjunctive proposition "Mr. Nogot owns a Ford and Mr Havit owns a Ford" ; but his actual justification is the proposition "Mr. Havit owns a Ford". This illustration however serves to make one point clear, viz., that when a man comes to know a proposition to be false, he no longer offers this as evidence for a proposition. But it is quite possible that when he offers a proposition as evidence for another proposition, the proposition that acts as the justifier may be false. However, so long as it is not known to S he will continue to offer it as evidence and will accordingly be justified.
Meyers and Stern introduce here a new concept of 'well-takenness to replace justification under certain circumstances. Suppose that a person Miss Information reads in a book on history of philosophy that Spinoza was born in 1732. She infers from this that Spinoza was born in the eighteenth century. She however is mistaken for Spinoza was born in 1632. She thus cannot be justified in believing that Spinoza was born in the eighteenth century. But take the case of another person Mr. Fancy who too wrongly believes that Spinoza was born in the eighteenth century because he thinks Spinoza was born in 1732. But he thinks that Spinoza was born in 1732 because he dreamt it. Is not there an important difference between the cases? How can we capture the difference if we deny that Miss Information is justified in believing that Spinoza was bom in the eighteenth century? Here the concept of well-takenness has a rote to play. There is indeed a difference between the persons. Though none of them is justified in believing what she or he believes Miss Information is well taken in believing the proposition but Mr. Fancy is not. One is well taken in believing a proposition if one has followed an accredited route to knowledge. Since she has consulted a relevant book by an expert, her belief is well taken. But the other person who believes what he believes because he has dreamt it, cannot be said to have a well taken belief. His belief that Spinoza was born in the eighteenth century is neither justified nor well taken. Thus when some philosophers insist that false propositions also may offer justification, their claim may be taken as valid if it is meant that beliefs upon such propositions are only well taken.
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