NOTES AND REFERENCES

Gautama, Nyayadarsanam edited by Taranatha Nyaya Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohana Tarkatirtha, Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1985, see sutra no. 1.1.3.


Vatsyayana, Bhasya on Nyaya sutra no. 1.1.5, in Nyayadarsanam.


The Nyaya philosophers give a causal account of knowledge. According to them a number of causal conditions conjointly give rise to a  prama or true cognition. Among these causal conditions (karana), one which is the most effective is called the instrumental cause or karana and that is technically called pramana. As regards the question: which condition is the most effective, there are two prominent views, (i) that causal condition which through some operation produces the effect, viz. prama or true cognition, is the most effective condition and hence the karana, or (ii) that condition, immediately after the occurrence of which the effect, viz., prama, is produced is the karana.
Uddyotakara, Nyayavarttika, on Nyayasutra 1.1.5 in Nyayadarsanam.


Paramarsa, i.e., the cognition to the effect that the subject of inference (paksa) possesses such a property (which is the hetu or inferential mark) as is pervaded by the inferable property (sadhya) is generally a perceptual cognition according to the Naiyayikas. But it is a bit different type of perception indeed, for it is produced not merely by the relation (sannikarsa) between the sense-organ and the object but has the remembrance of the relation of pervasion (vyapti-smrti) as one of its causal conditions. An account of the way in which paramarsa occurs is as follows. The knower’s sense-organ is in contact with the paksa (say, a hill) as well as the hetu (say, smoke) and as a result, has a perceptual cognition to the effect that the paksa (hill) possesses the hetu (smoke); this perception causes the remembrance of the relation of pervasion which all the members of the class of smoke (which is the hetu in this example) have with fire (which is the sadhya), as previously experienced by the knower. Through this remembrance a non-physical relation (alaukika sannikarsa called jnanalaksana) is established between the knower’s sense-organ and the property of being pervaded by fire (the sadhya), which the instance of smoke present in the hill, possesses as being a member of the class of smokes. Thus the knower perceives that the hill (the Paksa) is possessed of the smoke (the hetu) which is pervaded by fire (the sadhya), though fire itself, which is a relatum of the relation of pervasion in this case, is not perceived at that time.
An alternative explanation as to how a paramarsa arises is also given. (See Gangesa, Tattvacintamani) After having the perception of the hill (paksa) as possessed of smoke (hetu) and having remembered the relation of pervasion which smoke has with fire (sadhya), the knower by means of his/her inner sense-organ (manas) directly apprehends that the smoke which is present in the hill is also, as a member of the class of smoke, pervaded by fire. In this case also the remembrance of the relation of pervasion establishes a non-physical relation between the knower’s sense-organ (manas) and the property of being pervaded by fire and thus makes the perception possible.
In the first explanation it was a case of external perception whereas according to the second explanation it was a mental (manas) perception, but in both the cases it has remembrance as one of its causal conditions. Gangesa maintains that in most cases paramarsa is a case of mental perception (manasa).


The Naiyayikas admit paksata as a necessary condition of anumiti, and it means absence of the knowledge of sadhya in the paksa, accompanied by the absence of desire to infer the same sadhya in the same paksa. See Annambhatta, Tarkasamgraha Dipika, Section 49, edited and translated by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1976.


Gangesa, Tattvacintamani Pratyaksa Khanda, edited by Kamakhyanatha Tarkavagisa, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1974, p. 308-9.


Ibid., p. 327 and 341.
The Naiyayikas, however, recognize some cases of inference where despite the falsity of paramarsa the resulting inferential cognition is true. For example, someone misperceives steam as smoke, and seeing (mistakenly) that smoke is coming out of some place and remembering that smoke is pervaded by fire, comes to believe that the place possesses such smoke as is pervaded by fire. This belief which is called paramarsa, is false here, since that place actually possesses steam and not smoke. But from this belief the person concludes that there is fire in that place, and on verification the inferential belief is found to correspond to fact. So according to the Nyaya definition of prama it should be regarded as prama. This certainly poses some problem for them so far as their theory of paratah pramanya regarding the origin of prama is concerned. They have to face this question: if a prama can be caused by a false paramarsa then how can that prama be said to be caused by the required guna or excellence. The Naiyayikas have attempted to answer the question by conceding that the required excellence (guna) for giving rise to a true inferential cognition (anumiti prama) might not be the same in all cases.


Jayantabhatta, Nyayamanjari, a commentary on Nyaya-sutra of Gautama edited by Gourinath Sastri, Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1982. See part I, p. 164-5. Visvanatha, Vrtti on Nyayasutra 1.2.4 in Nyayadarsanam.


By pararthanumana (inference for others) two things are meant: (i) an argument, that is the verbal expression of an inferential process, which some person employs to convince others of his position; (ii) the inferential process which takes place in the mind of the person who hears the argument. If stress is given on ‘parartha’ i.e., ‘for others’, the first sense seems to be the primary sense; if, on the other hand, emphasis is on ‘anumana’, i.e., ‘inference’, the second sense should be the primary sense.
It is in the context of a philosophical debate (vicara) between two parties holding opposite positions regarding something that pararthanumana is employed. The argument has a definite form. It is a compound sentence comprising five component sentences (pancavayavavakya). It starts with the statement of the position and ends with the assertion of the position, the other three sentences which occur in-between state the reasoning process. This five-membered conjunctive sentence, when heard by a person holding the opposite position or by a mediator (madhyastha) who is neutral, generates in the mind of the hearer an inferential process through which the same conclusion is reached. Thus through pararthanumana one can convince others of one’s position or can prove one’s position. From the point of view of the person employing a pararthanumana, it is a way of proving, whereas from the point of view of the person for whom it is employed it is a way of knowing.


Gangesia, Tattvacintamani, Anumana Khanda with Didhiti and Gadadhari edited by Vindhyeswari Prasad Dvivedi, Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1970. See Kevalanvayiprakaranam.


In some schools of Indian philosophy objective novelty, in the sense of knowing some thing which was not known to the knower (anadhigatarthavisayakatva), is one of the defining characteristics of prama or knowledge. But the Naiyayikas reject this view of knowledge. They maintain that it is not necessary for a prama to be about some object which was hitherto unknown, for there are admittedly some cases of prama where this condition cannot be satisfied, for example, omniscient God’s knowledge is such, because at no point of time nothing can be unknown to Him.
That the Naiyayikas do not admit objective novelty to be an essential characteristics of prama is evident also from their theory of pramanasamplava, i.e., one and the same object may be known by means of different pramanas at different time; that means, even when an object is known with the help of one pramana it may be known through another pramana. So a subject can have knowledge (prama) of an object which is already known to him/her.
Moreover, the Naiyayikas cannot be said to claim objective novelty in the conclusion of an inference, because they hold that a subject can draw a conclusion which is already known, if he/she has a special desire for that. See note no. 6.


See Varadaraja, Tarkikaraksa, Reprint from The Pandit, 1903. Gangesa, Tattvacintamani, Anumana Khanda, Tarkaprakarnam


Gangesa, Tattvacintamani, Anumana Khanda, Samanyalaksanaprakarnam.


Ibid. Vyaptigrahopayaprakarnam.


Kesava Misra, Tarkabhasa, with Hindi translation by Badrinath Sukla, Motilal Banarasidass, Varanasi, 1968. See p. 120.


This proposal of treating paramarsa as only a step in the inferential process and not as a premise may not, however, be accepted in some cases of inference. Indian logicians admit that in some cases an inference is drawn on the basis of a verbal cognition (that is, a cognition which one has on hearing a sentence) in the form of paramarsa (sabdaparamarsa). For example, on hearing the sentence ‘The hill possesses smoke which is pervaded by fire’ a person has a verbal cognition to the effect that the hill, which has been referred to, possesses smoke which is pervaded by fire. On the basis of this sabda paramarsa the person infers that the hill in question possesses fire. In this case neither paksadharmatajnana nor vyaptismrti precedes the inferential cognition, but paramarsa alone precedes it. So, in this case paramarsa should be treated as the premise from which the inferential conclusion follows.