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If we look into the internal structure of the cognitive states which constitute the entire inferential process, we shall find that every inference or anumana involves three elements: paksa or the subject of inferential cognition, sadhya or the inferable property which is to be predicated of the subject and hetu, the inferential mark or reason. The typical expression of an anumana is; ‘p has s because of h’, here s is inferred to be present in p, on the basis of h. So p is the paksha or the subject of inference, s is the sadhya or the inferable property which is to be predicated of the subject and hetu, the inferential mark which bears the inferential relation with the s, i.e., the inferable property. It is by virtue of this inferential relation that h can serve as an inferential mark for s. The inferential relation is known as the relation of vyapti or pervasion. If a thing X is related to another thing Y in such a way that wherever X is present Y is also present then X is pervaded by Y. In that case X can function as the hetu or the inferential mark for Y.
The psychological process of anumana or inference according to the Nyaya philosophers is like this. Let us consider the commonly used instance of an inference, namely, the inference of a fire in a hill on the basis of smoke. The inferer first perceives smoke coming out of a hill; this perception reminds him of the truth that smoke has the relation of pervasion (vyapti) with fire, something which he had ascertained earlier. This remembrance leads to another perception,5 where the inferer perceives that the hill possesses such smoke as is pervaded by fire. From this he concludes that the hill has fire.
So the inferential cognition to the effect that the hill has fire is preceded by three cognitions:
- The perception of smoke in the hill;
- The recollection to the effect that smoke stands in the relation of pervasion with fire;
- The perception that smoke as is pervaded by fire characterizes the hill.
The second cognition, namely, the recollective cognition of the relation of pervasion, however, depends on a previous non-recollective cognition of the relation. But this non-recollective cognition of the relation of pervasion, though presupposed, does not form a part of the actual process of inferring.
Now, the three cognitions mentioned above are the causal conditions which lead to the inferential cognition. The first cognition is named as paksadharmatajnana, the second one as vyaptijnana and the third as paramarsa. These three cognitions have a partially common object, viz. the hetu or the inferential mark. The same hetu which was perceived to be present in the paksa (cognition I), is remembered to be pervaded by the sadhya (cognition II); this again leads finally to perceive the hetu as characterized by the relation of pervasion with the sadhya to be present in the paksa (cognition III). It is also clear that these cognitions are casually related; the first cognition causes the second one, and that again causes the third, after which the inferential cognition (anumiti) results.
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