....Previous

Even to be a minimal realist the Buddhist isrequired to posit a weak causal link between what is empirically available and what is hiddenly or representationally so. But since this link itself, on the received Buddhist accounts, is perishable, the question of reduction of 'empirical real' to 'representationally real', even if pressed, cannot be satisfactorily settled one way or the other. Both Locke and Kant grappled with the issue in their own ways and, caught in the cross-currents of representationalism, realism and phenom­enalism, had to remain content with a sort of dualism, a curious mix of realism and empiricism, far from execution of any reductive programme. Matilal's rejection of Dummett's implied(?). 'God's-eye-view' of the (logically determinate) universe is understand­able. Equally understandable is his reservation about the so-called 'humanistic' rehabilitation of Buddhist Abhidharma (phenom­enalism and representationalism) and the Madhyamika sunyavada, After all his aim is to defend direct realism mainly on the basis of objective universal (jati) and nominal universals (upadhi). In this respect, while he follows the insights of the Naiyayikas like Uddyotakara and Udayana, he keeps well in view the semantic-epistemic cues provided by the Navya-nyaya and the Euro-Ameri­can analytic thinkers.

The steps Matilal takes to establish his thesis of direct realism and, in the process, stave off scepticism, are in brief as follows.

First, we cannot logically recognize particulars like substance, quality and action unless we recognize, real universals like. substancehood (dravyatva), qualityhood (gunatva) and actionhood (karmatva). The relation between universals and particulars may be understood in two different ways, pro-reductionist and antireductionist. A universal F may be true of a, b and c. For, F-ness to be true (as predicate/universal) of logical subjects a, b and c need , only to be simple property of a, b and c, .P-ness can be said to be in existence if it is /can be property of the logical subjects a, b and c. In case F-ness is simple and unanalysable it may be regarded as  'natural kind' or 'metaphysical kind' and accorded a place in the core or 'inner circle' of Matilal's conceptual (rather, ontological) scheme. When F-ness satisfies this necessary condition of existence, i.e., is expressible in and through a, b and c or some observable features of objects,  it is being understood in a pro-reductionist manner. According to Matilal, Nyaya admits that most of the universals or abstract entities are to be analysed observationally.

Cowhood of cow and the cow proper may be perceived directly or, as Gangesa calls, non-constructively, Matilal observes ‘The universals and basic properties are directly grasped by our awareness as ultimates.' But this awareness is non-qualificative and pre-linguistic, i.e., inexpressible. Jati and akhanda upadhi, though said to be cognitively graspable, are not representable, Besides real universals and concrete properties, the only relational universal that is recognized as real and objective by Matilal, following the Nyaya tradition, is inherence (samavaya). Other relations like samyoga (physical conjunction) and svarupa-sarnbandhas (identity relations), though objective and useful for analytic and communi­cative purposes, are not admitted into the 'inner circle' of Matilal's conceptual (or ontological) scheme.

V

To think, as Matilal does, that the real universals and basic properties of the core area of his ontological scheme are self-contained, and whatever falls outside the core area needs the core contents for its understanding, seems to be flawed on several counts.

First, the implied core/periphery or existent/subsistent di­chotomy is unclear and needs elucidation. Merely to speak of their asymmetry is not enough. What happens to the core contents if change takes place in the non-core area? Must we take that the asymmetrical relation between the above two areas is fixed and static? If the question is answered in the affirmative, the ontological scheme fails to accommodate growth of knowledge or history of science.

Secondly, if the question is answered in the negative, Matilal or his defender is expected to justify the privileged status accorded to the 'inner circle' consisting of genuine universals and properties. How can the possibility, if not necessity, of interanimation and overlap between the two 'circles' be rationally ruled out? Related to this question is another equally pertinent question: If universals and properties, the two main species of the core (ontological) population, essentially linguistic in our (human) understanding, can be credited to have pre-linguistic existence, how can their scope and identity possibly be presented to other selves and even to ourselves? If the scope and identification conditions remain undetermined, how can the line of demarcation, If any, between 'the inner circle' and 'the outer circle' be drawn by humans (who are without God's all-pervading view)? Here, from the human standpoint, the talk of distinction between the ontological dis­course and the epistemological one makes little or no sense and the attempt based thereon to salvage direct realism is destined to collapse.

Next..