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Under another interpretation, the negative one, Madhyamika dialectic causes despair in us and makes us think that all that we experience in this world is momentary, discrete and unreliable. Since I have already discussed this interpretation, I do not wish to repeat it here. But by referring to these two interpretations what I want to highlight is this, These two interpretations need not be viewed as contradictory. Rather they are complementary. What is or seems to be phenomenally unreal is transcendentally real. This double-aspect view of reality takes cognizance of what seems to be empirically unreal and also gives an account of why it does appear so.

IV

The scepticism about the external world centres mainly around the arguments for and against the efficaciousness of the pramanas, in general, and perception; in particular. It is true that some Buddhists like Dharmakirti and Dharmottara recognize perception and inference as pramana. But others like Dinnaga maintain that perception may be viewed under samyagjnana or valid knowledge and need not be recognized separately. Somewhat like Dinnaga, Santaraksita does not speak of knowledge in his defini­tion of perception. However, this is not to suggest that they do not recognize perception as a sort of knowledge. The only point to be mentioned generally is that their treatment of perception gives one the impression that perceptual knowledge is not capable of providing us direct knowledge of the external world. The sort of knowledge that we get from perception is held to be more or less indefinite. An element of construction or kalpana gets mixed with our perception of the external world. From Dharmakirti's account of perception found in Nyayabindu it is clear that he is trying to defend a sort of perceptual representationalism. Perceptual knowledge 'corresponds to' or 'agrees with' the world outside us. And it may be confirmed by our practices and fulfillment of our aims. But he does not rule out the role of some intermediate psychological states between (the percipient's) perception and the world perceived.¹³

This account of perception may not appear to be convincingly realist or even objective. Some philosophers like Dinnaga defend perception as that form of knowledge which is free from kalpana orconceptual construction. However, the role of kalpana invariably remains in some form or other in inference. To make his view of perception very rigorous Dinnaga qualifies it by 'abhranta', room for illusions and errors, the claim of inference to be in agreement with what is objectively real gels weakened.

The talk one often hears of scepticism about the external world and the objects in it is basically due to a mix-up of ontological and linguistic issues. Certainly in a sense the realist is justified in asserting that the apple I see is there independently of its being seen by me; its shape, colour and weight (if measured) are not due to my interpretation (of what I see of the apple in question). But can I justifiably assert merely on the basis of my visual perception of it that I know it? What about its weight? Without a weighing machine (and which must of course be reliable) one cannot be sure of its weight. What about the other side of the apple not visible to me? Either I have to infer it or I have to go around to have a view of it. But then I cease to see this (previously seen) side and about it I have to rely on my memory or fall back again upon inference. This line of analysis may be further refined and many hidden complexities brought out, e.g. (a) the inadequacy of direct/native realism, and (b) the ineliminable role of construction not assignable to this or that specific perceptual capacity.

Maulal's discussion of the Abhidharma phenomenalism of Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu brings out this point clearly. Not only the dharmas perceptible by the five human sense organs but also those graspable by mind can be shown to be substantively there as existent (dravya-sat), But this is not recognized by Vasubandhu as good enough ground to deny what is empirically/phenomenally there (samsara /samvrti-sat). In a Heideggerian vein one may point out that both samsara and samvrti etymologically mean what is partially hidden or enveloped. More relevant to my discussion is the co-present or complementary distinction between what is empirically real and what is substantive or existentially real.

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