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There is no fixed order of anteriority, posteriority or simultaneity between the two. In some cases the causes of knowledge precede the objects of knowledge. For example, sunlight as cause remains operative before the objects (to be) seen with its help by it come into being. In some cases the objects of knowledge are there before the cause of knowing them becomes available to the percipient. For example, the table, chairs and books of my study room were there before I switched on the light and saw the same. Again, in some cases (smoke and fire, for example) the cause and the object of knowl­edge are found to be coexistent.⁶

The Nagarjunite critique of perception as a means of knowl­edge, at least in its manifest form, may be met without much difficulty. But once we take seriously the Naiyayika's point that no (purported) refutation of a pramana is possible without prior acceptance of some or other pramana, the Buddhist's criticism of perception loses much of its initial thrust. This is not to affirm that perceptual scepticism is totally rejected. The chief exponents of the Madhyamika school like Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, Candrakiriti and Santideva, somewhat like the Sankara Vedantin, try to show how our discursive knowledge of the phenomenal world is beset with contradictions, antinomies and sublation.⁷ Only when we have at our disposal some non-discursive mode of knowl­edge which is disclosive of and affined to the very nature of the reality to be known, do we get glimpses of knowable objects even at the level of perceptual judgment. The ultimate reality or things-in-themselves, whatever they may be, lend themselves to alterna­tive (vaikalpika) modes of apprehension. What is there is not exactly graspable. The unavoidable gap between what-is-there (to be known) and who-is-here to know it is bound to subdue our praise for perceptual statements. Perceptual identification of an object always leaves an element of indefiniteness attending or around both the perceiving mind and the perceived object in question. Reidentifiability of the object does not improve the situation significantly nor can it remove the said indefiniteness. Lingering effects of previous perceptions, force of habits, undercurrents of the web of beliefs, etc. are always there to make the picture more or less opaque, despite its objectivity.

Not only perception but even inference as a means of knowl­edge has been questioned. The forms of questioning are numer­ous and naturally conditioned by the questioner's diverse points of view. The Nagarjunite criticizes it as a part of his project of critique of all sorts of pramanas. The Carvaka the materialist-empiricist who recognizes only perception as means of knowledge rejects the claim of inference as an independent means of knowledge. In recent times the validity of inference has often been questioned on the grounds of: (i) the alleged arbitrary and purely conventional character of the rules of inference, (ii) the untenability of the proclaimed self-justifying nature of the rules of inference, and (iii) the diverse interpretations of logical constants.

Some of the objections raised against inference maybe briefly mentioned here. Generally speaking, the universal relation (vyapti) believed to obtain between probanda and probans is at times misperceived for some reason (partial analogy, for example) or other. If ants are seen carrying off their eggs or peacocks are heard screaming, we infer the gathering of rainclouds followed by rain. A swollen river leads us to infer that there has been rain upstream. But all these inferences may be incorrect. A river may overflow because of its low embankments. Ants may carry off their eggs because their anthills have been damaged. The so-called screaming of a peacock may be nothing but mimicking by an expert.⁸

However, the Naiyayika refuses to recognize these alleged aberrations or counter-examples as invalidating inference (as a means of knowledge). On the contrary, he holds that the very identify of the probans, the true nature of the overflowing river', 'the (frightened) egg-carrying ants' and 'the screaming peacocks', has not been correctly grasped by the objector (against inference) owing to which his formulation (examples of objection) is faulty, i.e., fails to show that the inference is irregular.

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