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Perception is said to be due to sense-object. contact, direct or Indirect, proximal or distal. But the (possible) objector or critic can argue to this effect: perception can neither be prior to, nor posterior to, nor simultaneous with the objects of sense. First, perception cannot be prior to the object to be perceived, the colour of a flower, for example. How can we perceive a colour which is yet to come into existence? Secondly, perception (of the fragrance of a flower, for example) cannot be posterior to its (possible) existence. How can one smell a flower's fragrance when it is no longer there? Positively speaking, one cannot perceive the object which has gone out of existence in every sense of the term. When the very objective source of sense-perception goes out of existence, it cannot be logically credited to have sent a signal which could be perceived later on (by a percipient) . However, the Nyaya formulation of the 'impossibility' of posterior perception has not been formulated in a very rigorous way, keeping in view, for example, perception of the very distant astronomical bodies which have gone out of existence but can be perceived later on for a definite length of time, depending upon the time-distance be­tween the percipient and the body in question. Apparently, the reasons of these non-rigorous formulations are twofold. The Naiyayika has in his mind the well-known Buddhist doctrine of the momentariness of time which denies both its pastness and futurity. Further, the Naiyayika's own view of lime, defined in terms of our relation to the sun, is not perhaps efficient enough to deal with our contemporary astronomical knowledge.

Thirdly, the critic also discounts the possibility of simultane­ous perception, i.e., simultaneous existence of the percipient and the objects of perception, colour and smell of a flower, for exam­ple. According to the received view, perceptions are successive. One who perceives colour cannot at the same time perceive smell. Two perceptual cognitions are destined to be distinct and Successive. But since temporal orders of succession between the sense and the specific object, between pramana and prameya, are not definitely ascertainable, the outcome of perception remains doubtful. Alternatively, the critic’s objection may be construed in this way. Colour-perception and smell-perception are not of the same (perceptual) kind. Inferential remembrance of colour may appear to be simultaneous are with the smelling of fragrance. Since perception and inference are two different means of knowledge, they cannot be simultaneous. Besides, mind believed to be atomic in substance and necessary for production of knowledge, can be 'in touch' with only one kind of knowledge at a time, perception or inference, but not both.

If these objections of the critic are valid, the Madhyamika scepticism stands vindicated and the Nyaya position is put into jeopardy. Naturally, the Naiyayika, in this case Vatsyayana, commenting on Gautama's Nyayasutras, tries to show the weakness of the objections.

Unless the precise intention underlying the objections raised against perception as a means of knowledge is understood, the response can hardly be appropriate. Does the critic mean to deny the very existence or possibility of pratyaksa (perception) as a pramana (a means of knowledge) or does he merely want to question only its efficaciousness in specific cases because of the attending difficulties or obstructions or non-obtainability of the necessary and sufficient conditions? The very attempt to deny the existence of perception, it is argued, commits the Buddhist to the view that there is perception (which may be refuted). On the other hand, if perception qua pramana can be refuted, the Naiyayika tells the Buddhist, it is (at least) established that there is a way (pramana) of refuting a pramana's claim that it is a pramana, perceptual or otherwise. This concession takes away the proclaimed radical thrust of critics like Nagarjuna who in their dialectic question the very existence or possibility of perceptual knowledge.

Incidentally, the realist Naiyayika tries to meet the sceptic's objection that pramana (proof), being itself of the nature of a prameya (provable), is not of much epistemic or logical consequence. He points out that prameya is not a very weak because what is prameya or Prameya is the object of knowledge and pramana the cause of that knowledge.

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