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Nagarjuna’s discourse on consciousness (vijnana), discernible objects of consciousness (vijneya) and how the embodied agent/ knower is formed, makes it plain that he is trying to offer us a purely phenomenal account of all that with which we are concerned in our life. His dialectic is intended to free human mind from the fetters of the sense-bound body living within the framework of passions and habits, and enmarked by the indefinite and alternative ways of viewing and reviewing the world. The true seeker is required to overcome the phenomenal duality of existence and non-existence and thus become calm (santa). When Nagarjuna clearly tells one that if one can tear off the nets of false views (kudrstijala), one obtains 'nirvana by abandoning desire (raga), delusion (moha) and hatred (dvesa)', we cannot doubt the exist­ence of unsullied (alipta) persons alone about whom talk of nirvana and the ways of obtaining that nirvana makes sense.⁵

Not only in SSK but in his other works like Catuhstava(CS) and Bodhicittavivarana (BV), Nagarjuna sarcastically refers to 'the dogmatists' who get scared by the lion's roar of emptiness (sunyata simhanada) '. There are four main aspects of Nagarjuna's dialectic. Ontologically speaking, it tries to show that all phenomena, be­cause of their essencelessness and mutual dependence, are empty. Epistemologically speaking, the ultimate truth, the undeniable object of cognition, is not really objective in the ordinary sense of the term. It is so only metaphorically (updadya prajnapati). Psychosomatically speaking, the ultimate truth, nirvana, is the relinquishment of all passions, cravings, hatred and delusion. Ethically speaking, the ultimate aim of life is freedom from the bonds of /tarma and subjection to the inner imperatives of compas­sion, non-violence and love. To posit the ultimate aim of life and to indicate therewith what is really real, how that reality can be grasped in a non-discursive intuition (prajna) and what its psychosomatic accompaniments are, normally show that Nagarjuna and philosophers of his persuasion are not nihilist or sceptic as we understand the terms.

II

The main logical controversy between the Madhyamika and the Naiyayika centers round the question whether pramana prameya relation is or is not interdependent or circular. Nagarjuna tries to show that pramana theorists fail to show that pramana is not a prameya and, further, that a pramana itself is a prameya, i.e., in need of being proved. But the Naiyayika claims to have established that a knowledge-claim or prama-claim, despite its prameya character (in principle), is really knowledge. Otherwise the whole doctrine of prama becomes hollow. Nyaya's initial pratijna orproposition dial pramana and prameya are inseparable (misra) provides Nagarjuna a plank of attack on the former's position. Their inseparability, it is argued, indicates that neither is self-established. This depend­ence of one upon the other is said to be indicative of the inefficaciousness of both.

Understandably, the Naiyayika rejects this interpretation of his view by the Madhyamika. According to the former, pramana and prameya as padarthas, though co-relative, i.e., in a sense circular, are not viciously so. On the contrary, they can establish each other or be mutually supportive. Pramana, like light, is self-established or self-proved. But in case the correctness of a pramana is questioned, it is possible to remove it by evidence, argument, example, etc. In this limited sense pramana or what is said to be pramana at one stage may well be regarded as prameya at another. That does not compro­mise their padartha character in any way.

But this argument is not acceptable to the Madhyamika. He introduces his well-known dialectic at this stage. If pramanas are said to be valid in their own right, the question of their being dependent upon anything else and at any stage does not arise. Besides, the Naiyayika, having stated initially (pratijna) that  pramana and prameya are inter-related, cannot logically claim that pramanas are self-established. For, that amounts to pratijndhani, retreat from the initial position. Additionally, it is pointed out that if pramanas themselves need something else for their self-establishment, it creates a sort of anavastha, infinite regress. If the proofs cannot prove the probables, how can regress be stopped?

One of the main planks of the Buddhist form of scepticism is the alleged unreliability of perception as a means of knowledge or proof (pramana). The objection against perception may be formu­lated in very many ways. But propose to look into the Nyaya formulation of a possible objection against perception and it could be met.

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